We describe the situated inference model and discuss how it may contribute to better understanding priming effects and their absence. The model suggests that priming effects result when primes make certain ideas more likely to come to mind and those ideas are misattributed to one's own thoughts, interpreted in light of situational affordances. This perspective organizes a range of moderators identified in previous priming studies. We also describe new research that has tested the model's predictions. Finally, we consider the implications of the model for debates about the nature and replicability of priming effects on higher order cognition and behavior.
Sometimes simple ideas combine to create something surprising. The effects of incidental stimuli (primes) on higher order thought and behavior are surely surprising, and this has contributed to both enthusiasm and skepticism about priming effects. We have argued that the appearance and disappearance of priming effects can be understood based on the combination of three simple premises.
The first is that primes tend to increase the accessibility of related information, making certain thoughts and feelings more likely to come to mind. The second is that people tend to assume that their thoughts and feelings are about whatever they are attending to at the moment (even when the thoughts were actually caused by something else; see Higgins, 1998) . And the third is that people tend to use accessible thoughts and feelings to guide responses to the situations in which they find themselves. From this perspective, priming is expected only when all three of these processes coincide. Stated simply, priming effects result when primes make certain ideas more likely to come to mind and those ideas are misattributed to one's own thoughts, interpreted in light of situational affordances. To know how a prime will affect behavior, we need to know what thoughts are activated, who these thoughts are attributed to, and where (e.g., in what context) people can apply them.
Some important consequences fall naturally out of these basic ideas. They help explain, for example, why a single prime might have a variety of different effects, such as altering judgments in one study, motives in another, and behaviors in yet another. They also help explain why priming effects may sometimes be found but other times may be elusive. In this paper, we summarize the situated inference model (Loersch & Payne, 2011 ) in which we have formalized these ideas. We highlight recent empirical findings predicted by the theory, and consider the implications for recent debates about the replicability and context-specificity of priming effects.
THE SITUATED INFERENCE MODEL

CORE MECHANISMS
Accessibility. According to the situated inference model, priming effects emerge through a basic three-step process (see Figure 1 ). This begins ( Step 1) with a prime increasing the accessibility of related information. Accessibility is generally understood to mean the likelihood that a given piece of information will be retrieved from memory (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966) and used in subsequent processing (Higgins, 1996) . Many kinds of information can be made accessible, including (for example) mental content that is semantically (Neely, 1991) , experientially (Bearce & Rovee-Collier, 2006; Conway, 1990) , or affectively (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) related to the primed stimulus. These basic accessibility effects do not necessarily rely on the conscious act of perception (de Groot, 1983; Fowler, Wolford, Slade & Tassinary, 1981; Marcel, 1983) and can be produced by subliminally presented stimuli (Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992) . As such, both conscious and nonconscious processing of a priming stimulus can produce the initial change in construct accessibility from which higher order social priming effects emerge. Misattribution. The increase in accessibility resulting from priming has often been viewed as having an immediate effect on responses. For example, accounts of goal (Bargh, 1990; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) and behavior priming (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001) often assume a direct effect of primes on behavior, unmediated by further thought processes. We suggest, in contrast, that this simple change in accessibility does not produce a direct effect on judgment or behavior. Instead, primes affect responses when this accessible content is mistakenly attributed to one's own internal thoughts and feelings about whatever is in the focus of attention (Step 2). People will tend to act in ways consistent with the implications of those thoughts and feelings, but what are the implications? It depends on the demands and opportunities afforded by the situation.
Afforded Questions. The meaning of primed information for the person depends on the particular question(s) afforded by the situation (Step 3). Notably, different situations afford different questions, and this can cause the same accessible content to produce very different effects. For example, although being asked to think about another person and their personality traits affords the question, "What type of person are they," being asked to think about yourself will instead afford the question, "What type of person am I?" To the extent that prime-related content is misattributed to the focal target, these two situations will produce two distinct priming effects, differentially producing changes in other versus self-perception (e.g., a more aggressive personality in one's friend vs. the self; DeMarree & Loersch, 2009) .
Although this example demonstrates how the situated inference model accounts for the variable effects of primes on perception and judgment (i.e., construal priming), this same process can be used to understand behavior and goal priming as well. This is because some situations naturally afford questions about how to behave, or what one wants. When this occurs, accessible content that becomes misattributed to one's response to these questions will affect the behavioral (or motivational) inferences that are drawn. Again, this can cause the same accessible content to produce very different downstream consequences. If, for example, one mistakenly assumes that hostility-related thoughts are accessible because of their desire to aggress, then a behavioral priming effect may emerge (e.g., more intense punishing behavior; Carver, Ganellen, Froming, & Chambers, 1983 ; see also Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001) . In this way, the situated inference model naturally provides an answer to the "many effects of one prime problem" that Bargh (2006) identified as a central second-generation issue for the field. A single prime produces a myriad of downstream effects because its misattributed accessibility can have very different inferential implications across situations.
This process need not be conscious or deliberate. Instead, just as with attributional processes in other domains (e.g., spontaneous trait inferences; Newman & Uleman, 1990 ), these processes have been shown to occur outside of conscious awareness (Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009; Loersch, Durso, & Petty, 2013; . Indeed, we view the basic process of using accessible information to infer the answer to environmentally afforded questions as a constant and obligatory aspect of the decision-making system, one that simply cannot operate at a solely conscious level. Because the environment continuously affords different questions as one seeks to understand the situation and determine how best to interact with the people and objects present, consciously attending to every decision would be 140 LOERSCH AND PAYNE untenable. Even without conscious involvement, however, the inference process we propose allows the mind to naturally integrate one's past learning history with the constraints of the current situation to guide behavior in a contextually appropriate matter. It is only because of the challenges of accurate source monitoring that this process introduces errors and produces priming effects.
THE FLEXIBLE USE OF ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION
Because the situated inference model proposes that accessible content simply serves as a source of information in the decision-making process (see also Jefferis & Fazio, 2008) , various metacognitive factors and mindset manipulations (Fujita & Trope, 2014, this issue) can exert important influences on the process. For example, any variable that affects the perceived validity of prime-related content will modulate its impact on judgment and behavior. When the accessible information is seen as highly valid (e.g., because it is associated with trust, confidence, ease, fluency, etc.), it will be especially likely to produce a priming effect. If the same content is instead associated with feelings of invalidity, then it will not produce an assimilative effect and may even lead to contrast effects if the metacognitive cues are strong enough to produce a correction motive (Wegener & Petty, 1995) . Mindset manipulations can have similar effects because they also alter the way accessible information is used. For example, mindsets can cause people to habitually compare accessible content to a salient standard, a process that can cause the same prime to produce very different effects depending on whether people focus their comparison on similarities or differences (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012; Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008) .
MODERATORS OF PRIMING EFFECTS
Since the original demonstrations of the basic priming effects, many of the publications in this area have documented the operation of various moderators. Although this isn't well explained by models that emphasize direct, automatic effects, the situated inference model's proposed process naturally captures many of the key moderators that have been identified. In the following section, we discuss some of the important moderators and highlight how they are accounted for by our perspective. Because the model suggests that construal, behavior, and goal priming all occur through the same basic process, the following discussion will not be concerned with the exact type of outcome which is moderated. Readers interested in such a breakdown are encouraged to refer to our initial presentation of the model (Loersch & Payne, 2011, pp. 240-247) . Following this review of past research, we briefly summarize new research that has directly tested moderating variables as specifically predicted by the situated inference model.
KNOWN MODERATORS AFFECTING MISATTRIBUTION
Aspects of the Priming Event. Because prime-related accessibility will only produce a priming effect when misattributed to an alternative source, the model pre-dicts that any variable affecting the likelihood of misattribution will be an important moderator. Evidence for this hypothesis can be seen throughout the literature, as many of the identified moderators directly relate to the confusability of prime-related content with the target of judgment. For example, primes that are especially distinctive are unlikely to be misattributed to alternative targets because the information they make accessible isn't vague or general enough to be confused with other sources. Because of this, highly distinctive primes can only exert an influence on the decision-making process by serving as a comparison standard that highlights how different the target of judgment is from the accessible construct (Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Mussweiler, 2003) . These stimuli, such as animals with extreme features (e.g., using sharks to prime fierceness) or a specific person with known traits (e.g., using Albert Einstein to prime intelligence), often produce contrast effects rather than prime-consistent responses (see Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983) .
Information made accessible by a prime is also difficult to misattribute when the priming manipulation is particularly blatant or salient. Under these conditions, the true source of the accessibility is obvious, and assimilative priming effects are prevented. This is why it is especially important that participants in a priming experiment do not perceive a direct connection between a priming manipulation and the dependent measure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . When misattribution is prevented in this manner, the most likely way for the prime to exert an effect is if individuals feel that it will bias their judgment and engage in effortful, motivated correction (Martin, 1986; Wegener & Petty, 1995) . It is for this reason that blatant (Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; Newman & Uleman, 1990 , Petty, DeMarree, Briñol, Horcajo, & Strathman, 2008 or well-remembered priming manipulations (Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987) generally produce contrast effects on judgment or behavior. It is important to note, however, that blatant priming will not inevitably induce these correction efforts. In particular, if people mistakenly believe the prime-related content is self-generated, this information may still be confused with that person's response to the current situation. In these cases, misattribution can still occur and the primes produce assimilation effects (Moskowitz & Roman, 1992; Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000) .
Aspects of the Target. The likelihood of misattribution can depend upon factors that are related to the target of judgment as well. When the target of attention is highly distinctive, only a very limited subset of information is relevant, thereby decreasing the number of dimensions on which it is susceptible to priming effects (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) . In contrast, highly ambiguous targets (e.g., novel or nonsense animals like "jabos" or "lemphors," Herr et al., 1983) are especially likely to show priming effects because they are non-distinct and their characteristics can be plausibly confused with many different types of accessible content.
Another target-related moderator that uniquely applies to goal and behavior priming is the self-concept. The role of the self-concept in these priming effects (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007 , this issue) makes manipulations that target self-perceptions especially effective at producing behavioral changes (DeMarree & Loersch, 2009 Petty, 2001) have been successful at producing such effects. Because the primes are self-generated, they are easily confused with personal motives and thoughts about how to behave, and are unlikely to instantiate correction motives.
Situational Factors. Finally, there are a number of situational factors that can affect the likelihood of misattribution. By reducing the ability to accurately check the source of accessible information, cognitive load manipulations such as increased time pressure (Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002) and multiple-task requirements (van Boven & Robinson, 2012) increase the impact of primes. Conversely, other factors prevent misattribution by motivating people to pay special attention to the source of accessible content. When one is suspicious that they may have been exposed to subliminal primes, for example, they are less likely to misattribute primerelated content to their own thoughts about how to behave (Verwijmeren, Karremans, Bernritter, Stroebe, & Wigboldus, 2013) . In the realm of behavior and goal priming, high levels of self-consciousness (induced, for example, by the presence of a mirror) can also prevent primes from impacting behavior (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2000) . Because high self-consciousness is associated with increased salience of personal goals and standards (Carver & Scheier, 1978) , fewer constructs are able to be misattributed to the active self-concept.
KNOWN MODERATORS AFFECTING THE USE OF ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION
Target of Focus. Although the above misattribution-related moderators are most important for determining if a prime will produce any effect, moderators that affect the type of question afforded by the environment are critical for determining exactly what that effect is. Because different targets of focus often afford unique questions, manipulations of this variable frequently cause the same prime to produce very different effects (Jefferis & Fazio, 2008) . In one study (DeMarree & Loersch, 2009 ), participants were subliminally primed with social stereotypes related to either hostility (African Americans) or passivity (Buddhist monks). They then spent a few minutes thinking about either their own lifestyle and personality or those of their best friend. These targets afford different questions ("Who am I?" vs. "Who are they?"), thereby causing a single prime to differentially affect self versus other perceptions of trait aggression.
This same basic processes can also be used to explain the moderating role of personal need in the subliminal persuasion literature (Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002; Veltkamp, Aarts, & Custers, 2008) . Because having a strong need (e.g., being very thirsty) causes people to search the environment for ways to achieve the goal, it too can be used as a manipulation of attentional focus. This can make primes that relate to the need (and therefore provide an answer to the basic question afforded by it) particularly effective (Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006) .
Metacognitive Cues. Because prime-related content is used as information for answering afforded questions, any variable that changes the way people use this information will influence the final priming effect. Although not always framed as an influence of metacognitive cues, such effects have been obtained by several labs. For example, positive affect is seen as a cue that one should use mental content, whereas negative affect is seen as a cue that current thoughts should not be trusted (Briñol, Petty, & Barden, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 1988) . Accordingly, assimilative priming effects are seen when the primed content is associated with feelings of positivity and reversed when associated with feelings of negativity (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007; Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006; Custers & Aarts, 2005; Fishbach & Labroo, 2007) .
Because they also alter how accessible content is used, mindset manipulations can have similar moderating effects. For example, participants can be trained to habitually compare accessible content with a salient standard, looking for ways in which the two constructs are similar or different, depending on the mindset that is activated. While similarity mindsets cause judgment and behavior to assimilate to the prime, comparison mindsets cause contrast effects (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012; Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008) . Other mindsets (Fujita & Trope, 2014 , this issue) can also affect priming by generally causing people to approach decision making in either an open or cautious manner, trust or distrust their current thoughts, or differentially focus on answering concrete versus abstract questions afforded by the environment.
NEW EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE MODEL
Core Processes. Although the situated inference model was developed only recently, a number of studies have been conducted to directly test its hypotheses. One of the most central predictions is that primes shape responses mainly when accessible information is misattributed to one's own internal reaction. Loersch and Payne (2012) tested this idea by priming subjects with subliminally presented and masked words related to either profit or equity, before participants played an economic game which contrasted those two motives. During the priming task, participants were instructed to stare at the computer monitor while clearing their minds of all thoughts. Half of the participants were (correctly) told that the flashes they saw during the priming task could make some thoughts more likely to come to mind. This instruction encouraged participants to attribute their thoughts to an external source. The other half were told that the flashed stimuli would make it harder to generate thoughts. This instruction encouraged an internal attribution for thoughts because whatever information came to mind did so in spite of external interference. As expected, participants' decisions in the economic game were influenced by the primes only when internal attributions were encouraged. A second study replicated these effects by priming "fast" versus "slow." Again, primes influenced the speed of subsequent responses only when participants were encouraged to attribute primed thoughts to their own minds. Responses in the external attribution conditions tended toward contrast effects.
A second critical prediction of the model is that primes should affect responses by providing a meaningful answer to the questions afforded by the situation. Loersch, Durso, and Petty (2013) tested this hypothesis by subliminally priming participants with words related to the concept "clean" or "dirty." They then presented participants with a set of cleaning products to be evaluated, and manipulated the question afforded by framing the attitude question in two ways. One group was asked, "Considering your potential need for this product, how desirable is it?" In this condition, participants primed with dirty liked the cleaning products more than those primed with clean. The other group was asked, "Considering this prod-uct's physical state, how desirable is it?" In this condition, participants primed with clean liked the products more than those primed with dirty. These results highlight the role of afforded questions in producing priming effects, and suggest that the downstream consequences of priming critically depend on what participants do with the accessible information.
A third important prediction of the model is that the consequences of priming depend on metacognitive inferences about whatever thoughts or feelings come to mind. In some recent work, we tested a variety of manipulations which have been shown in previous research to influence whether participants consider their momentary thoughts to be valid or invalid . For example, participants in a position of power assume that their thoughts are more valid than the powerless. Participants also assume that thoughts that come easily to mind are more valid than thoughts that come with difficulty. Across several kinds of manipulations (power, subjective ease, and confidence), assimilative priming effects were only seen when participants were induced to experience a sense of thought validity after priming. Consistent with the predictions of the situated inference model, the same primes instead produced contrast when associated with feelings of invalidity.
The model makes similar predictions about general mindsets related to information validity. In one recent study, participants were instructed to "go with their gut" when making a social judgment during the experiment. They then read information about a target individual while being subliminally primed with either positive or negative masked images. Those individuals who were given the mindset to make decisions based on their intuitive gut feelings were more affected by the subliminal primes than participants given instructions to simply read the information (Loersch, McCaslin, & Petty, 2011 ; see also Croizet & Fiske, 2000; De Houwer & Smith, 2012 , for similar findings with affective primes).
Sequential Priming. Typically, behavioral priming is discussed separately from sequential priming. In sequential priming, within-subjects procedures are frequently used as implicit measures to assess individual differences in attitudes or other associations. In a typical study, primes (e.g., black and white faces) are presented for a short duration immediately before a target (e.g., a valenced word or a Chinese ideograph, see Fazio et al., 1986; Payne et al., 2005) . Although participants are instructed to respond only to the target (e.g., by categorizing it as positive or negative), the typical finding is that the primes influence behavior by making individuals more likely to judge the target in a prime-congruent manner. Some implicit measures (e.g., the affect misattribution procedure or AMP; Payne et al., 2005) may produce their effects through the same basic process proposed by the situated inference model. That is, the downstream consequences of the information made accessible by the primes is expected to influence subsequent decisions and actions when mistakenly assumed to reflect one's thoughts and feelings about the subsequent target. This misattributed content should then be used in a contextually sensitive manner to answer whatever question is afforded by the current situation.
Evidence for these predictions was recently obtained by Gawronski and Ye (2014) . Within the context of the AMP, it was shown that a prime can make a variety of information accessible (including both affective and semantic content) and that the precise influence of that activated content depends on the current question afforded by the situation. For example, when participants were asked to judge the animacy of Chinese ideographs in the AMP (i.e., "Does this object represent an animate or inanimate object?"), the animacy information made accessible by a prime (e.g., kitten, maggot, pleasure, garbage, etc.) was misattributed to the ideograph target. When the same primes and targets were presented but participants were instead asked to judge the ideograph's valence (i.e., "Does this object represent a positive or negative object?"), the prime's evaluative content instead affected judgments.
Implicit-Explicit Correlations. Across a great deal of research, there have been relatively low correlations between these implicit measures and corresponding explicit measures designed to measure the same construct (e.g., attitudes toward African Americans; see Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012) . Critically, because it makes predictions about the process by which prime-related accessibility impacts judgment and behavior, the situated inference model can be used to help understand the conditions under which implicit measures will predict explicit judgments.
For example, in one study, we measured individual differences in affective responses to same-sex couples using a sequential priming task (i.e., the AMP). Next, we asked one group to consider reasons that the feelings experienced during the priming task were intentional. Another group was asked to consider reasons that their feelings might be unintentional. Finally, we measured explicit homophobia. The basic affective reactions measured by the priming task were more likely to be endorsed as explicit homophobia (resulting in higher implicit-explicit correlations) when participants were randomly assigned to consider their feelings as intentional (Cooley, Payne, & Phillips, 2014) . Consistent with the situated inference model, metacognitive inferences regarding intention determined whether primed content was used to answer the question afforded by the homophobia questionnaire.
CONTEXT-SPECIFICITY AND REPRODUCIBILITY
A great deal of attention has been given to recent failures to replicate some classic priming effects (e.g., Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013) . Although there has been substantial debate over the meaning of these results, we suspect that much of the controversy has to do with predicting only simple, direct effects of a prime. While this impression is consistent with some well-known theories and early results, it is largely inconsistent with the sizeable literature on priming moderators that has developed over the years.
A strength of the situated inference model is that it provides a framework that naturally accounts for many moderators. Indeed, when one considers the situated nature of priming, it is no surprise primes affect judgment and behavior differently in different labs and in samples from different populations. Humans are not automatons. As one can see simply by observing daily life, our species is incredibly adept at modifying behavior to meet the needs of the current situation. By reconciling the automatic nature of priming effects with the social reality that our behavior is highly contextualized, the situated inference model helps emphasize this fact. Interestingly, our perspective suggests that priming both is and is not a ubiquitous phenomenon. On one hand, the model outlines a basic decision-making process that is continually active. Information in the environment makes related mental content accessible and that information can potentially be used to guide judgment and behavior. This process is "priming" in the narrow sense that a stimulus has made related information more accessible. The counterintuitive priming effects that have been the focus of debate occur through the same process, except that they are accompanied by a source monitoring error in which people mistake the true source of accessible information. In this sense, priming must be a less frequent occurrence because these are a subset of all times that information becomes accessible. Although every billboard, traffic sign, and overheard conversation we pass during a walk down the street may indeed prime us, this information will only have surprising effects on behavior if misattributed to one's internal thoughts and then used to answer some question afforded within a subsequent situation.
The same reasoning applies when considering how easily priming effects should emerge in exact replication attempts. Our model suggests that three presumably independent processes must co-occur. The primes must make the same mental content accessible for a new subset of participants, these individuals must then mistakenly attribute this information to their own thoughts about whatever dependent measure is targeted, and they need to view these thoughts as important and relevant to the particular question afforded by that dependent measure. Many factors can easily disrupt one or more of these processes, thereby making even exact replications more challenging than might be expected. Different subject populations might possess different stereotype content or have relatively weaker associations between the primes and the critical concept that needs to be activated. Because of this, replication studies testing a sample of participants that differs from the original sample are less likely to be successful simply because the associations and cultural contexts may differ. For example, Shanks and colleagues (2013) sampled participants from ages 18-79, recruited from both universities and general communities in England, Sweden, Greece, and Australia.
Similarly, the presence of any alternative target to which the accessible content can be misattributed can easily "dilute" the priming effect by causing some subset of participants to misattribute prime-related accessibility to an unanticipated source. Finally, the suspicion that one is being manipulated can make participants distrustful, leading them to question their current thoughts. Such a process could easily prevent a priming effect Verwijmeren et al., 2013) even in an otherwise perfect replication. Moving forward, priming studies should measure and report subjects' perceptions and suspicions, preferably in ways that could be compared across samples to evaluate this possibility.
The reasoning outlined above suggests that priming should not be expected to be a robust and ubiquitous phenomenon. Instead, it will inevitably be contextualized. This does not mean that priming is not real or that it is not important, but simply that it will occur in a context-specific manner. By emphasizing this fact, the situated inference model helps make sense not only of existing studies, but also some failures to replicate past research. For example, although frequently categorized as a "failure to replicate," Doyen and colleagues (2012) actually provides positive evidence for behavioral priming. In contrast to past research (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) , there was no direct effect of priming on behavior, but the primed constructs did interact with the affordances created by experimenter ex-pectancies. Thus, just as we have argued, the effects of the primes depended on the current situation and its behavioral affordances (see also Klein et al., 2012) .
One criticism of past priming studies is that they sometimes showed large effect sizes and yet did not always replicate in later studies. Some authors have suggested that this indicates publication bias, in which large effects were selectively published. That is possible, but the context-specificity of priming suggests that unmeasured moderators could also explain these discrepancies. As we reviewed above, a variety of moderators can cause priming effects to be eliminated and in some cases to reverse. It is entirely possible that a priming effect in a sample with a particular set of assumptions, traits, and so forth could be large, and in another sample, with another set of assumptions, traits, and so forth, the effect could be absent. It would not be surprising that a hundred American undergraduates might respond differently to a prime than a hundred German community members. This is not a question specific to priming research. It is a basic issue of sampling and generalizability that is an issue in many areas of research. Of course, large representative samples would be an ideal solution, but resource constraints necessarily limit that possibility for many studies. If priming is highly context-specific, then much more attention should be paid in future studies (both original tests and replications) to carefully describing and controlling the social context.
CONCLUSIONS
The situated inference model sheds light on several controversies in the priming literature. It helps explain why a single prime can produce many different downstream consequences. It also clarifies how various situational factors will make priming effects appear and disappear. Although earlier models of priming suggested that stimuli could exert direct control over judgment and behavior, the contextual nature of priming effects is not well captured by these accounts. The large literature documenting various priming moderators suggests that priming does not follow this simple, direct, unchanging route. In contrast, the situated inference model acknowledges the basic, contextualized nature of behavior. In doing so, it highlights the power of the situation for shaping how primes have their effects, and how they do not.
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